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Abstract 
This paper explores the wage flexibility in Finland. The study covers the private sector 
workers by using three data sets from the payroll records of employers’ associations. The 
data span the period 1985-2001. The results reveal that there has been macroeconomic 
flexibility in the labour market. Average real wages declined during the early 1990’s 
depression and a large proportion of workers experienced real wage cuts. However, the 
evidence based on individual-level wage change distributions shows that especially real 
wages are rigid. In particular, individual-level wage changes have regained the high levels 
of real rigidity during the late 1990s that prevailed in the 1980s, despite the continued high 
(but declining) level of unemployment. 
Keywords: Wage flexibility; wage rigidity; wage cuts 
JEL classification: J30; J33  
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I. Introduction 
 
This paper evaluates the wage adjustment in Finland by using data from the payroll records 
of employers’ associations.1 The Finnish case provides particularly interesting environment 
to examine the wage flexibility for three reasons. First, there was an unprecedented collapse 
in aggregate economic activity during the early 1990s. Output fell by 14% in the years 
1990-1993. The unemployment rate increased in three years (1991-1993) to almost 20% 
from an average around 5% during the 1980s. Thus, Finland suffered its worst depression 
of the twentieth century not in the 1930s but in the early 1990s (e.g. Honkapohja and 
Koskela 1999; Böckerman and Kiander 2002; Koskela and Uusitalo 2006; Gorodnichenko 
et al. 2009). It is possible that this shock to unemployment caused changes in the way 
labour markets work and affected the strictness of constraints to downward rigidity of 
wages. 
 
Second, Finland has been a high-inflation country, where the rapid rate of inflation was 
compensated by the frequent devaluations of currency to regain competitiveness in export 
sectors. This traditional pattern of macro-level adjustment turned around when the Bank of 
Finland adopted inflation targeting after the depression of the early 1990s and the country 
joined to the third stage of Economic and Monetary Union in 1999. In February 1993 the 
Bank of Finland adopted a target rate of 2% per annum for the core inflation rate to be 
attained by 1995. The same target was upheld by the European Central Bank. The target 
was low given the inflation history of the three previous decades. The average inflation in 
Finland was 4.9% during the 1960s, 11.4% during the 1970s, and 6.8% during the 1980s.  
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Third, the structure of wage bargaining involves a high degree of coordination between 
both unions and employers, with a framework agreement being determined centrally on a 
one- or two-year basis, followed by union-level bargains (e.g. Vartiainen 1998). Hence, 
collective bargaining dominates wage formation and the coverage of collective bargains is 
roughly 95% of all workers, one of the highest rates in the OECD (e.g. Layard and Nickell 
1999). As one outcome of the binding collective agreements, wage compression is high. 
Despite discussions and pressures for changes in the institutions, the wage setting practices 
can be described as stable over the period of analysis (1985-2001).2  
 
This article is structured as follows. Section 2 provides descriptive evidence. Section 3 
reports results on the incidence of wage cuts. Section 4 analyses the micro-level rigidity of 
wages and Section 5 focuses on macro-economic adjustment. The last section concludes.   
  
II. Wage Changes  
 
We use three separate data sets for the private sector workers obtained from the payroll 
records of employers’ associations for the period 1985-2001.3 The observed wage change 
distributions are presented in Figs. 1-6. The distributions are centered around the contract 
wage change or actual inflation each year and then averaged over the years. The figures 
include also a symmetrical distribution around the median bin of the averaged distribution. 
For the contract wage this median bin is always the zero bin. For inflation the median bin is 
1 percentage point above the bin including the inflation rate. The contract wage increases 
 4
are the percentage wage changes implied by the contracts signed in each bargaining round 
as reported in Marjanen (2002) and they can be different for the three sectors.  
 
Figs. 1-6 around here 
 
In all sectors there is a peak in the distribution at the level of nominal wage increase 
stipulated in the collective agreements. The share of observations below the contact wage 
rise is substantially less than in a symmetric distribution. Hence, there is a cut-off in the 
distribution at the contract wage rise or just below it, and missing mass below that point. 
Compared to a similar distribution centered around inflation it is obvious that the contract 
wage rise determines the concentration of observations more than inflation. For inflation 
centered distribution the median bin is above the inflation bin, and there are excess 
observations several percentage points below the inflation rate (for the blue-collar workers 
this excess is smaller). Thus, the shape of wage change distribution depends mainly on 
general wage increase that is agreed upon in the collective agreements, and it might be 
dubbed as contract wage rigidity. Alternatively, these features indicate that the centralized 
bargaining institutions are the means that effectively produce real wage rigidity in wage 
setting. These same institutions may, however, also be means to secure concerted macro-
level wage moderation, as discussed below. 
  
There is not much evidence for nominal wage rigidity in annual distributions since there are 
no spikes at zero wage change for manual workers, and only very small spikes for non-
manual and service sector workers.4 However, during the depression years in 1992 and 
1993 there was a wage ‘freeze’ due to a centrally bargained extension of the previously 
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prevailing contracts. This centralized wage freeze created a large increase of zero nominal 
wage changes in these years (more prominent for non-manual manufacturing workers and 
service sector workers; for the service sector this freeze also continued to 1994). The 
distributions for the non-manual manufacturing and service sector workers are highly 
asymmetric below zero nominal wage change suggesting the presence of downward 
nominal wage rigidity. However, this lack of nominal wage cuts can also be induced by real 
rigidity. The small zero spikes suggest that this is most likely the case. 
 
There have been four industry-based contracts (1988, 1994, 1995 and 2000). The 
distributions in these years have not been very different from the histograms in surrounding 
years with centralized contracts, but there is some tendency that the support of the mode of 
wage changes is wider. This is consistent with somewhat more variation across industries 
in the ‘average’ wage change in the years of industry-level contracts. For both manual and 
non-manual manufacturing workers it is notable that after the depression the distributions 
are different from those before the depression in the sense that the distributions have 
become more concentrated during the late 1990s. The reason is that the Income Policy 
Agreements have been more comprehensive during the late 1990s as a consequence of 
macroeconomic difficulties, which has lead to the compression of wage changes around the 
level of centralized agreements. 
 
Along with the general rise, the collective agreements also include low-wage or female 
allowances with a purpose of increasing the wages for some groups more than by the 
general rise. In addition, a mixed pay rise formula (X% or Y euros at minimum) is often 
applied. It produces wage compression. To examine the solidarity aspects, we regressed 
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annual wage changes at the individual level in current year on wage levels two years 
earlier, because measurement error would produce the negative effect when using wage 
levels one year earlier. We include a full set of year and industry indicators to focus on 
wage compression across individuals within industries. There is evidence for a negative 
relationship that supports the prevalence of solidaristic wage setting in all sectors (Table 1). 
Hence, low-wage workers tend to get higher wage rises within industries. The effect is 
much smaller for the non-manual manufacturing workers, because individual-level wage 
bargaining is more important among them. It is also possible that the average wage level of 
non-manuals is so high that the solidarity aspects do not cover them. It is likely that wage 
compression biases real rigidity measures downwards, because some individuals are raised 
above the real rigidity zone, rather than to the zone, in the wage change distribution.  
 
Table 1 around here 
 
The median wage change has been strongly pro-cyclical in all sectors, and the development 
of the medians over time reflects strongly the evolution of inflation (Fig. 7). Fluctuations in 
the medians have also been in other respects largely similar across sectors. This is not a 
great surprise, because the period is dominated by collective agreements that have produced 
quite similar real wage rises across sectors, based on the average rate of productivity 
growth in the economy. This is often referred to as the “wage norm”. The median worker 
experienced real wage declines during the early 1990s. This contributed to a decline in the 
labour share of the total income (e.g. Sauramo 2004; Kyyrä and Maliranta 2008). Real 
wage increases of the median worker have also been smaller in the late 1990s compared to 
the late 1980s reflecting the macroeconomic difficulties of the 1990s. 
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Fig. 7 around here 
 
III. Wage Cuts 
 
It is a general presumption that centralized collective bargaining leads to compression in 
both wage levels and wage changes. There is evidence for this in Finland, but there is still 
considerable heterogeneity in wage changes. One indication of this is the existence of 
nominal wage cuts and the differences in their incidence across sectors. For non-manual 
workers in manufacturing and for the service sector workers, nominal wage cuts are rather 
rare, in spite of the depression, with annual incidence of nominal wage cuts in the range 
from 1 to 5 per cent (Table 2). In contrast, nominal wage cuts are much more frequent for 
manual workers in the manufacturing sector, the incidence reaching 36 per cent in 1991-
1992, and above 20 per cent in 1992-1993 and 1996-1997. There is also evidence that 
during the depression years downward wage adjustment started earlier for manual workers 
and continued longer in the service sector compared to non-manual workers. 
 
Table 2 around here 
 
The share of workers experiencing real wage cuts behaves remarkably similarly across 
sectors, being very high (60-80%) in 1991-1993. This pattern emerges from a large number 
of nominal wage increases that lie between zero and the inflation rate. This holds especially 
for the non-manual and service sector workers, which explains the larger difference 
between the shares of real and nominal wage declines for these groups. Nominal wage 
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moderation with the positive inflation rate during the depression made it possible to 
implement real wage cuts for a large share of workers without implementing aggregate 
nominal wage cuts by the collective agreements. Hence, centralized bargaining allowed for 
at least some downward adjustment of real wages.5 The brief economic slowdown that 
started in 1996 provides corroborating evidence for this. The bargaining system responded 
to this slowdown by postponing wage rises in 1997, which is shown in the substantial 
number of real wage cuts from 1996 to 1997. 
 
The estimates from probit models can be used to evaluate the factors that have contributed 
to wage cuts. The models reported in detail in Böckerman et al. (2007) include individual 
characteristics (such as gender, age and working hours) and employer characteristics (such 
as plant size and industry) as explanatory variables for the probability of the individual 
worker experiencing a wage cut. The results show that full-time workers have a lower 
likelihood of nominal and real wage decline. The service sector workers that work less than 
30 hours weekly are around 4 per cent more likely to experience a nominal wage cut. The 
effect is even larger for real wage reductions, which are around 9 per cent more likely for 
part-time workers compared with full-time workers. For manuals and non-manuals in 
manufacturing these effects are in the range of 1-3 per cent. The pattern is consistent with 
the efficiency-wage explanation and the fairness standards as an obstacle to wage cuts 
(Bewley 2007). Full-time workers are more important for the productivity of a firm 
compared with the part-time workers and hence they have a stronger bargaining position to 
prevent a wage cut, and firms are more afraid of a reduction in their productivity. The 
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fairness standards can also be tighter for the full-time insiders because of stronger 
attachment with the firm.  
 
Wage cuts are also more common in small plants. Depending on the sector, real wage cuts 
are around 5-8 per cent more likely in small firms compared with large firms. For nominal 
wage cuts this firm size effect is about 1-5 per cent. This result is in disagreement with 
fairness as an obstacle to wage cuts. Fairness standards should be stricter in small plants, 
because there are more repeated personal interactions between the employer and workers. 
However, the size of a plant can matter for other reasons. It is possible that the effective 
bargaining power of unions is weaker in small plants. Thus, unions are less able to resist 
wage cuts in small plants that concern firm-specific wage components that do not 
compromise the minimum standards stipulated in the collective agreements. Another 
explanation is that greater loyalty in small plants between the workforce and the employer 
can make it easier to cut wages in order to save jobs.  
 
IV. Micro-level Rigidity 
 
Dickens et al. (2007) present the method used for the estimation of wage rigidities in the 
International Wage Flexibility Project (IWFP), and discuss its features. We use the protocol 
developed in IWFP to measure nominal and real rigidities in wage setting. We concentrate 
on the results based on the estimated (‘true’) wage change distribution that is corrected for 
measurement errors in the data, rather than on the observed distribution.6 Generalized 
method of moments is used to fit a model of wage changes to the error-corrected wage 
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change histograms. The method uses the fraction of observations in each cell of the wage 
change histogram as the moments. The model assumes that, in the absence of rigidity, log 
wage changes have a symmetric two-sided Weibull distribution, which is referred to as the 
notional wage change distribution.7 Hence, in the absence of wage rigidities, the mean 
wage change equals the median wage change. Therefore, all deviations from the symmetry 
are caused by nominal and real wage rigidities. The measures are proportions of workers 
that are actually subject to particular type of rigidity of those workers that are potentially 
subject to the rigidity considered.8  The measures for wage rigidities vary between 0 and 1. 
A value of 0 indicates perfect flexibility (no one is subject to rigidity) and 1 indicates 
perfect rigidity (all workers potentially subject to rigidity are affected by it). The definition 
of nominal wage rigidity is the fraction of workers who are not affected by downward real 
wage rigidity, but who are affected by downward nominal wage rigidity. Thus, there is no a 
priori reason for the measures of nominal and real rigidity to be negatively correlated. 
 
We describe the results for the amount of rigidities as average values over several years, 
because there have been substantial fluctuations in the measures from year to year. One 
reason for the fluctuations is that it may be difficult to distinguish the effect of real wage 
rigidity from the effects of collective bargaining on wage determination. Centralized wage 
bargains set a floor for wage changes while allowing decentralized firm-level changes 
above the floor, often called “wage drift”. The spike will then reflect the negotiated 
minimum real wage change rather than the expected rate of inflation only. The protocol 
restricts the expected rate of inflation to fall within reasonable bounds. Then owing to wage 
drift, it is possible to estimate considerable real wage rigidity in years when the floor falls 
within a preset range for expected inflation, but not in years when the floor is above that 
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range. Another reason is that it may be difficult to separate nominal and real wage rigidity 
from each other during the years of very low inflation, i.e. during most of the late 1990s. 
However, this distinction is less relevant when inflation is very low, because the effects of 
nominal and real rigidities on wages are essentially the same.  
 
We use three periods; the late 1980s (1986-1990), the early 1990’s depression years (1991-
1993/1992-1994), and the late 1990s (1994-2000/1995-2001). The results show that the 
amount of nominal rigidity has been quite low in all sectors, but it rose considerably during 
the depression (Table 3, Panel A). This reflects the nominal wage freeze implemented by 
the collective agreements during the depression. The level of nominal rigidities was highest 
in the service sector, and smallest in the manual manufacturing sector. In contrast, averages 
of real rigidities reveal that the amount of real rigidities in wage changes has been smallest 
during the depression (Table 3, Panel B). The level of real rigidities was lowest in manual 
manufacturing and service sectors during this period. The amount of real rigidities has been 
highest for non-manual manufacturing workers in the late 1980s and the late 1990s. It is 
also notable that in the late 1990s the level of real rigidity has increased back to the late 
1980’s levels, despite much higher level of unemployment during the late 1990s. On the 
other hand, this pattern over time in real rigidity and unemployment makes it difficult to 
argue that real wage rigidities are the direct cause of unemployment.  
 
Table 3 around here 
 
All in all, there has been a great deal of either real or nominal rigidities in all sectors in 
most years. However, the constraint of real rigidity on wage determination was relaxed 
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during the depression. On the other hand, nominal rigidity increased and therefore formed 
the ultimate limit to downward wage flexibility. 
  
V. Macro-level Flexibility 
 
To analyse the real consequences of downward nominal wage rigidity and inflation Nickell 
and Quintini (2003) regress the share of negative real wage change on the inflation rate. 
The control variables include the median of real wage changes and the dispersion of real 
wage changes. Their results using UK New Earnings Survey over the period 1976-1999 
show that an increase in the rate of inflation produces an increase in the share of workers 
that experience negative real wage change. This result implies that downward nominal 
rigidity and low inflation together prevent the downward adjustment in real wages. 
 
We estimate Nickell and Quintini type regressions for manual manufacturing workers.9 The 
baseline model shows that the rate of inflation is not statistically significant in explaining 
the share of workers that have experienced negative real wage changes (Table 4, Column 
1). This is not surprising, because the share of negative real wage changes was particularly 
high in manufacturing during the depression when inflation was declining (Table 2). Hence, 
the result could be an anomaly related to the depression and associated disinflation. When 
we include an indicator for the years 1991-1993 the relationship between inflation and the 
share of workers that experience negative real wage changes is positive and statistically 
significant at 10% level (Table 4, Column 2). The quantitative magnitude of the impact is 
about twice as large as the one reported by Nickell and Quintini (2003) for the UK. This 
magnitude may still be too modest to provide an argument for raising long-run inflation 
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target, but it suggests that lower inflation (target) together with downward nominal wage 
rigidity have had some real wage effects.  
 
Table 4 around here 
 
As a further look at the macroeconomic flexibility of wage setting to economic conditions 
we estimate simple Phillips curves or wage equations. (Pehkonen 1999 provides earlier 
estimates.) That is, we regress the average changes in nominal wages on unemployment, 
productivity growth and expected inflation. We also use these regressions to evaluate the 
idea that downward rigidity of wages makes the adjustment of wages to economic 
conditions less flexible. Since downward wage rigidities mean that wage change 
distributions become asymmetric by shifting the negative nominal and real wage changes 
upward in the distribution, it means that the average wage change is higher with rigidities 
than without them. If the average wage change responds negatively to unemployment, the 
wage changes will become more constrained from below by rigidities when unemployment 
is higher. This implies that the response of average wage change to unemployment is 
smaller than without rigidities. We look at this effect by using the mean wage change from 
the estimated notional wage change distribution as the dependent variable in addition to the 
observed mean wage change. As noted earlier, the notional wage change distribution is a 
counterfactual distribution that would appear in the absence of rigidities for wage changes. 
It is symmetric around the mean change. If downward rigidities in wages prevent the 
adjustment of wages to economic conditions, the unemployment coefficient should be 
larger (in absolute value) in a regression for the estimated mean of notional wage change 
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distribution, compared to the coefficient for the observed mean. The estimated mean of 
notional wage changes and expected inflation originate from the protocol of IWFP. 
 
We report the results from the data in which we have pooled all sectors in Table 5. The 
lagged productivity growth is more significant than the current one, so we use it. The past 
observed productivity growth is probably taken into account in wage negotiations rather 
than the expected productivity growth during the contract period. For the service sector 
productivity growth is lagged two years as it seemed to work best. This indicates that the 
wage setting in services follows that of manufacturing sector’s by one year lag. The most 
important finding is that a significant negative relationship between wage growth and 
unemployment emerges. The effect of unemployment on the observed mean wage change 
is -0.4 in Column 1. The estimate is very close to what has been reported for Finland earlier 
(Uusitalo 2005). We also find that the effect of unemployment on the estimated mean wage 
change in Column 2 is almost the same as the one of the observed mean wage change. This 
is in contrast to the idea that the responsiveness of wages to unemployment is prohibited by 
downward wage rigidities. The observed wage changes seem to adjust to unemployment in 
the same way as the notional wage changes that are not affected by rigidities.10 
Productivity growth affects wage changes positively, with a coefficient of 0.5 in both of the 
models. The industry-level bargains increase wage growth by 2 percentage points compared 
to years with centralized bargains, a result consistent with the earlier evidence (Uusitalo 
005).  
able 5 around here 
 
2
 
T
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The measures for wage sweep up capture the extra amount of wage growth that arises 
because of downward wage rigidity. They can be included as additional variables in 
explaining unemployment to learn about the consequences of micro-level rigidities (see 
Dickens et al. 2007). The average wage sweep up can be interpreted as the increase in 
average labour costs due to downward wage rigidity. If firms are sensitive to unit labour 
costs, then a higher average wage sweep up should be associated with lower employment or 
higher unemployment, as predicted by the model of Akerlof et al. (1996). In our baseline 
estimations that pool all sectors, sweep up due to nominal rigidity obtains the expected 
positive coefficient but sweep up due to real rigidity obtains a negative coefficient (Table 6, 
Columns 1-2). However, the time pattern of sweep up measures shows that their behaviour 
is related to the changes during the early 1990s. The sweep up measures seem to reflect the 
reaction of collective bargaining to the changes in unemployment rather than the effects of 
rigidities on unemployment. Nominal wage freeze emerged as a reaction to the increase in 
unemployment in the early 1990s. This lead to higher nominal sweep up but to lower real 
sweep up as real wage rigidities were relaxed. Consistent with this interpretation, the 
amount of real wage sweep up gradually increased during the late 1990s as unemployment 
gradually decreased. After adding indicators for the wage freeze years, all statistically 
significant results regarding the sweep up measures disappear (Table 6, Columns 4-6). This 
confirms that the significance is driven by the depression years (The results using the sweep 
up measures that are based on different assumptions about the expected value and the 
variance of inflation produce similar findings.)   
 
Table 6 around here 
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Taken together, we do not find evidence that the notional mean wage change would be 
more sensitive to unemployment than the observed mean wage change. Furthermore, the 
extra wage growth due to wage rigidities is not correlated with any extra unemployment. 
This indicates that although the measured micro-level real rigidity is high, it is not notably 
undermining the adjustment of average wage changes to economic conditions. 
 
VI. Conclusions 
 
This paper studied the micro and macro flexibility of wages in Finland. We covered the 
private sector workers by using three data sets from the payroll records of employers’ 
associations. Two main conclusions emerge. First, there has been macroeconomic 
flexibility in the labour market. This means that average wage changes negatively respond 
to an increase in unemployment and the downward real rigidity measure declined during 
the worst years of the early 1990’s depression. Consistent with this, a large number of 
workers experienced a decline in their real wage as unemployment soared. This was put 
into effect by wage moderation through collective agreements. However, nominal wage 
rigidity increased during the depression and formed the ultimate limit to downward wage 
flexibility. Accordingly, we found that lower inflation exacerbates real consequences of 
downward nominal wage rigidity. Second, the evidence based on individual-level wage 
change distributions reveals that real wages are in general very rigid. Because of the 
dominance of collective bargaining, the contract wage rise constitutes a clear cut-off in the 
distributions. Hence, it is difficult to separate real wage rigidity from contract wage rigidity. 
Alternatively, this indicates that the centralized bargaining institutions are the means that 
effectively produce real wage rigidity. However, the same institutions have allowed for 
 17
average wage changes to respond to economic conditions. The evidence also points out that 
individual-level wage changes have regained the high levels of real rigidity during the late 
1990s that prevailed in the 1980s, despite the continued high (but declining) level of 
unemployment.  
 
Regarding the future of wage formation, it is interesting to note that after the depression 
union density has declined by more than 10 percentage points in less than ten years. This 
rate resembles the decrease in the union density during the Thatcher years in the UK 
(Böckerman and Uusitalo 2006). However, this has not led to any increase in real micro-
level wage flexibility, because the union contacts are still almost always extended to non-
members.  
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Table 1. The sensitivity of wage changes to the lagged wage level 
 
 
Dependent variable: wage change (t)  
 Manual 
manufacturing 
Non-manual 
manufacturing 
Service sector 
workers 
    
Wage level (t-2) -0.044*** 
 
-0.008***  
 
-0.037*** 
t-value (-94.02) (-44.59) (-71.46) 
    
N 815 976 877 749 1 162 380 
    
 
Notes: t-values in parentheses. Significance indicated by *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%). All 
models include a full set of unreported indicators for industries and years. 
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Table 2. The share of workers that have experienced negative wage changes 
 
 
 Nominal wage Real Wage 
 Manufacturing Manufacturing Services Manufacturing Manufacturing Services 
 Manual workers 
Hourly pay 
Non-manual workers 
Monthly pay 
 
Monthly pay 
Manual workers 
Hourly pay 
Non-manual workers 
Monthly pay 
 
Monthly pay 
1990-1991 16.9 2.0 2.4 60.1 47.8 20.8 
1991-1992   36.4 2.7 5.4 69.5 87.2 81.5 
1992-1993  20.6 5.4 3.9 57.8 74.4 83.1 
1993-1994   8.4 1.4 4.7 11.8 14.5 69.8 
1994-1995    5.0 1.2 2.7 6.5 2.3  4.2 
1995-1996     10.4 3.3 2.8 12.3 4.8  4.0 
1996-1997   23.3 2.7 4.8 48.2 61.3 74.3 
1997-1998  11.4 1.3 3.4 18.7 6.4  5.7 
1998-1999   11.4 3.5 3.9 17.5 7.6  6.1 
1999-2000    6.8 1.6 3.4 33.7 34.9 38.6 
 
Notes: Real wage change is based on actual inflation measured as the annual change in the cost-of-
living index by Statistics Finland. 
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Table 3. The amount of nominal and real wage rigidities (averages over several years) 
 
Panel A. Nominal wage rigidities    
 Manual 
manufacturing  
Non-manual 
Manufacturing 
Services 
The late 1980’s 0.00 0.29 .. 
The early 1990’s 
depression 
0.44 0.69 0.98 
The late 1990’s 0.06 0.31 0.25 
    
Panel B. Real wage rigidities   
 Manual 
manufacturing  
Non-manual 
Manufacturing 
Services 
The late 1980’s 0.29 0.73 .. 
The early 1990’s 
depression 
0.04 0.23 0.00 
The late 1990’s 0.60 0.70 0.47 
 
Notes: The late 1980’s are 1986-1990, the depression years are 1992-1994 for services and 
1991-1993 for other sectors. The late 1990’s are years 1994-2000 (1995-2001 for services). 
The estimates are calculated by using the protocol by Dickens et al. (2007). 
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Table 4. Nickell and Quintini type regressions for the manufacturing manual workers 
 
 
Dependent variable: the share of negative real wage changes  
   
Median of real wage change -5.42** -4.36** 
 (-4.26) (-3.86) 
Dispersion of real wage changes (P75-P35) -0.96 1.39 
 (-0.22) (0.38) 
Inflation rate 1.49 1.61* 
 (1.54) (2.01) 
Change in inflation rate -1.55 -0.43 
 (-1.15) (-0.36) 
Dummy for the recession years (1991-1993) .. 0.13** 
  (2.70) 
   
N 19 19 
Adjusted R2 0.80 0.86 
  
Notes: t-values in parentheses. Significance indicated by ** (5%), * (10%). 
 
Table 5. The sensitivity of wage changes to unemployment  
 
 
 Observed mean Estimated mean
Unemployment (t) -0.440** -0.426** 
 (-5.33) (-4.24) 
Productivity growth (t-1) 0.485** 0.503** 
 (4.11) (3.50) 
Expected inflation (t) -0.144 -0.222 
 (-0.60) (-0.76) 
Industry-level bargain 0.018** 0.020** 
 (3.35) (2.96) 
   
N 41 41 
Adjusted R2 0.75 0.67 
 
Notes: Unreported indicators for the sectors and a constant are included. t-values in 
parentheses. Significance indicated by *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%). The estimated mean and 
expected inflation are calculated by using the protocol by Dickens et al. (2007). 
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Table 6. Sensitivity of unemployment to sweep up due to nominal and real wage rigidity 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Inflation -2.20*** -2.29*** -2.34*** -2.14*** -2.16*** -2.24*** 
Wage freeze indicators .. .. .. 0.03** 0.02* 0.03*** 
       
S-up-N 0.72*   -0.26   
S-up-R  -0.91**   -0.18  
Sum   -0.33   -0.90 
       
N 41 41 41 41 41 41 
Adjusted R2 0.75 0.76 0.72 0.77 0.77 0.78 
Overall R2 0.79 0.80 0.76 0.81 0.81 0.82 
  
Notes: S-up-N is the magnitude of sweep up due to nominal rigidity computed as -n×(average notional wage change for those with 
notional wage changes less than or equal to zero)×(fraction with notional wage changes less than or equal to zero). S-up-R is the 
magnitude of sweep up due to real wage rigidity assuming that the median of the observed wage change distribution is equal to the 
mean of the notional wage change distribution, and that the mean of the true wage change distribution is equal to the mean of the 
observed wage change distribution. It is computed as (mean wage change - median wage change - nominal sweep up). Sum is the sum 
of S-up-N and S-up-R. The estimates for the amount of sweep up are calculated by using the protocol by Dickens et al. (2007). Wage 
freeze indicators in models 4-6 obtain value one for the years 1992, 1993 and 1997 in manufacturing and for the years 1993, 1994 and 
1997 in services. Unreported indicators for the sectors and a constant are included. Significance indicated by *** (1%), ** (5%), * 
(10%). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figs. 1-6. Wage change distributions 
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Fig. 7. Actual inflation and the median wage change by sector 
 
 
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
0.09
0.1
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
inflation manuals non-manuals services
 
 
 31
Appendix A: Data description 
 
We use ‘wage surveys’ of two Finnish employers’ associations. Manufacturing sector 
manual (hourly paid) blue-collar workers and non-manual (salaried, monthly paid) white-
collar workers are covered by TT (Teollisuus ja työnantajat). The private service sector 
workers are covered by a survey of PT (Palvelutyönantajat). Wage information in these 
surveys originates directly from the payroll records of companies. Thus, they can be 
characterised as administrative or register based data. These data are very accurate, and 
the measurement error in surveys of individual workers, like recall or rounding error, is 
not a significant problem.  
 
The survey frame of the data consists of the member firms of both associations in each 
reference period. Although the survey is mandatory for firms with over 30 workers (the 
limit varies somewhat by industry), some non-response will occur. This is concentrated 
on smaller firms that are also less often members of the associations. The coverage of 
the TT data is better than that of PT, since service firms are smaller on average. To 
identify employers in TT data there are firm codes and ‘response-unit’ codes. There has 
been a break in the firm coding system during our observation period, but the response 
unit codes are consistent over time. Thus, we use those to identify the employer of 
individuals. The response-unit refers to the establishment of a firm. In the service sector 
only the firm code exists in the data, so we use it. 
 
The data are well representative at the worker level, since the TT/PT firms have good 
electronic systems for collecting wage data. There are some missing or erroneous 
identity codes. Those individuals are excluded from wage changes. However, after the 
early 1980s these problems are very rare.  
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The structure of these data is quite similar across sectors. They provide information 
about wages and working time, and some information about workers’ individual 
characteristics (such as age and gender). However, there are two major differences in 
these data sets across the sectors: the timing of observations and the wage concept. For 
manual manufacturing workers the data covers the situation during the last quarter of each 
year for the period 1981-2000, but the situation during one month of each year for non-
manual (salaried) manufacturing workers (September before 1993 and December in and 
after 1993) for the period 1985-2000 and the private service sector workers (August 
before 1995 and October in and after 1995) for the period 1990-2001. This change-over 
causes no major problems because the observation month is delayed and there is a point of 
normal contractual wage increase between the two observations (otherwise we might 
overestimate downward rigidity). We might underestimate the rigidity by lengthening the 
observation interval if more than the usual one or two annual contract wage rises fell on the 
interval. However, this is not the case for either sector. The observation interval changes 
only by two or three months, so the change-over years should be comparable to other 
years. 
 
The wage concept differs across sectors. Hourly rate has been applied for manual 
workers in manufacturing, whereas monthly rate (salary) for non-manual workers in 
manufacturing and for service sector workers. The monthly rate for non-manual workers 
in manufacturing is defined as ‘the fixed basic monthly salary paid for regular working 
time’. This fixed salary is based on the ‘demands’ of the job or tasks performed in it and 
the contract-based wages determined for these ‘demand classes’ of jobs, and an 
additional person-specific component based on personal competence. Respectively, in 
services the monthly rate is defined as the ‘personal wages paid for regular working 
 33
time’, which is very close to the former definition. It includes such personal and ‘task’ 
specific bonuses (merit pay), which are paid at the same amount in each month. These 
monthly wages exclude such components of wages, which are inherently chancing or 
are not part of the ‘basic wage’ of a person. Excluded are among others overtime pay, 
shift work, evening or Sunday bonuses, fringe benefits, and performance based 
payments, commissions, ‘profit sharing’ and similar payments. It should be noted, that 
the monthly wage is not simply a ‘minimum’ salary based on contracted wage scales, 
but includes a person-specific component. Firms and local unions can also agree on 
firm-specific wages that exceed the minimum requirements of national contracts. Such 
firm-specific arrangements can be reduced by mutual consent of the firm and local 
union. These person and firm-specific components in wages provide possibilities for 
both upward and downward flexibility in wages. 
 
For measuring hourly rate for manufacturing manual workers there are two options: the 
wage per hour for regular working time, or the wage per hour for straight time work 
(time-rate). We use the time-rate, because it is a better measure of the person’s ‘basic’ 
wage. The regular-time measure includes compensation from all types pay, that is, time-
rate, piece-rate and performance based pay. Therefore, it can change if the structure of 
hours of work performed as time work, piece-rate work or performance work change. 
Such wage changes reflect changes in person’s work effort which is problematic for the 
purposes of studying downward rigidity of wages. A wage cut arising from less hours or 
less effort in piece-rate work is not what is meant by flexible wages, which refers to 
changes in the ‘basic wage’ of persons. Therefore, we use the hourly wage measure for 
time-rate work. It is calculated by dividing the wage bill for time-rate hours by hours 
worked on time-rate. Wages and hours are those earned and worked during the fourth 
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quarter of each year. This hourly wage measure excludes piece-rate and performance 
work, overtime pay (and hours), and shift work, evening, night and Sunday bonuses, as 
well as bonuses based on working conditions. It includes any firm-specific wages paid 
above minimum contracts, and any ‘personal bonus’ incorporated in each person’s 
individual ‘wage rate per hour’ that is used in remuneration for his/her time-work. 
Again, these person and firm-specific components in wages provide possibilities for 
both upward and downward wage changes, and deviations from the wage changes in 
centrally negotiated contracts. 
 
A drawback of using the time-rate hourly wage is that it leads to the omission of small 
number individuals from the data, who are 100% paid on piece-rate or performance pay. 
The straight time hourly wage can also be based on few hours, but it is not clear that this 
should produce any problems as such, as long as the wage bill and hours data are 
otherwise accurate.  
 
The wage changes are constructed for job stayers, that is, only workers who have the 
same employer and the same occupation during the two consecutive years are included. 
It is standard in micro-level studies of wage rigidity to restrict to the wage changes of 
persons who remain in the same job (e.g. Bewley 2007). Wage changes related to job 
promotions or demotions and employer switches reflect changes in job tasks, working 
conditions and location amenities, which contaminate measurement of wage rigidity. To 
control for the variation arising from changing working hours for non-manual and 
service sector workers’ monthly wages, it is required that the “regular weekly hours” are 
the same in both years.  
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1 This paper is based on the analyses of the project Wage Rigidity and Labour Market Effects of Inflation 
financed by the Finnish Work Environment Fund. Part of the results draw upon work conducted in the 
International Wage Flexibility Project. We are grateful for the IWFP leaders and partners for co-operation 
and comments. All errors remain our responsibility. 
 
2 The centralized framework was abandoned only during 2008-2009 wage negotiations. Employers’ 
associations repealed their central organization the right to agree upon wage contracts with corresponding 
workers’ organization. 
 
3 Appendix A provides a description of the data sources. Uusitalo and Vartiainen (2008) examine the 
changes in wage structure in Finland by using the same data. 
 
4 Böckerman et al. (2006) document the annual distributions. 
 
5 There was an attempt by the social partners to cut nominal labour costs by 7% in 1991 in order to avoid 
currency depreciation. (The proposition to cut labour costs by 7% included 3% cut in nominal wages and 
4% transfer of pension contributions from employers to workers.) However, this attempt failed because 
two major unions delayed their support for the pact and the financial markets forced the Bank of Finland 
to abandon the fixed exchange rate in November 1991. After that episode the labour market organizations 
did not accept any cuts in nominal wages, but agreed, for the first time since the Second World War, to a 
two-year social pact without any nominal pay rises.   
 
6 The procedure assumes that the true wage change is not autocorrelated, which implies that all 
autocorrelation in wage changes is due to measurement error. The estimated measurement error rate for 
manufacturing white-collar and the service sectors is around 0.05 whereas it is much higher in the blue-
collar manufacturing data, being 0.25 for this sector. The most likely reason for this is the different wage 
concept, which is the hourly wage rate for blue-collars as opposed to monthly salary for other sectors.  
 
 37
                                                                                                                                                                          
7 Details for the justification of using Weibull distribution can be found in Dickens et al. (2007). Briefly, 
examination of the wage change distributions in the IWFP project (and some other researchers) indicates 
that wage change distributions are more peaked and have fatter tails than the normal distribution. Second, 
the upper half of the distribution (above median), which is presumably not affected by wage rigidities, is 
well approximated by a Weibull distribution. 
 
 
8 To quantify the amount of rigidities it is necessary to make additional assumptions about the way that 
wage rigidities transform the notional wage change distribution to the observed distribution. Without 
rigidities we would observe the notional wage change distribution which is assumed to be symmetric. A 
fraction of the population is subject to downward real wage rigidity, if their notional wage change is 
below the expected rate of inflation, and they receive a wage change equal to that expected rate of 
inflation rather than equal to their notional wage change. The mean and standard deviation of the 
expected rate of inflation in each year are parameters of the protocol and they are estimated separately for 
each year. We use estimates in which the expected value and the variance of expected inflation are both 
constrained (standard deviation constrained to be less than 0.6%). A fraction of the population is also 
potentially subject to downward nominal wage rigidity. Such workers who have a notional wage change 
less than zero, and who are not subject to downward real wage rigidity, but who receive a wage freeze 
instead of a nominal wage cut, are affected by downward nominal rigidity. See Dickens et al. (2007) for 
details. 
 
 
9 We use the data for manual manufacturing workers, because the data are available for a longer period 
(1981-2000) only in this sector, which is necessary to have enough variation in inflation. 
 
10 We have estimated all models also with observed median wage change. The results are very close to 
those with observed mean. 
